

The impact of supply chain disruptions on business expectations during the pandemic[☆]

Brent H. Meyer^{a,*}, Brian C. Prescott^b, Xuguang Simon Sheng^c

^a Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree St. NE, Atlanta, GA, 30309, United States of America

^b Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO, 63130, United States of America

^c Department of Economics, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016, United States of America

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

Business expectations
COVID-19
Demand shock
Inflation
Pandemic
Supply shock

ABSTRACT

Utilizing the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Business Inflation Expectations (BIE) survey, which has been continuously collecting subjective probability distributions over own-firm future unit costs since October 2011, we document two facts about firms' marginal cost expectations and risk during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, in the early months of the pandemic, firms, on net, saw COVID-19 largely as a demand shock and lowered their one-year ahead expectations. However, as the pandemic wore on, firms' one-year ahead unit cost expectations rose sharply alongside their views on supply chain and operating capacity disruptions. Second, the balance of unit cost risks shifted sharply over the course of the pandemic and by the end of 2022, upside risks had sharply outweighed perceived downside risks over the year ahead. We find that both positive demand shocks (e.g. large order backlogs) and negative supply shocks (e.g. long supplier delivery times and labor shortages) have contributed to elevated short-term unit cost expectations and risk. Specifically, supply shocks accounted for roughly 40% of the increase in manufacturers' and nearly one-third of service-providers' unit cost expectations.

1. Introduction

At the onset of the pandemic, Meyer, Prescott and Sheng (2022, MPS hereafter) elicited firms' expected changes in selling prices, realized and anticipated wage growth, and qualitative responses to questions about the level of disruption the onset of the COVID shock was having on business operations, sales activity, and supply chains. Amid a sharp decline in firms' quantitative sales gaps, results to all of these special questions were in line with the notion that firms perceived the onset (and through the first 8 months) of the pandemic as a net *demand* shock.

However, as the pandemic continued, sales revenue, demand, and real output recovered relatively quickly. By the second quarter of 2021, real GDP growth had fully recovered its pre-pandemic level. Amid the resumption in real activity at the beginning of 2021, labor supply remained depressed and it became increasingly clear that supply chain disruption and shipping bottlenecks constrained the ability of firms to meet the rebound in demand. This paper builds on MPS (2022) and extends it along three dimensions.

First, we provide a complete picture of business unit cost expectations over the course of pandemic. In sharp contrast to firms' views early in the crisis, firms' one-year ahead unit cost expectations have risen sharply. Our interpretation is that the dramatic rise in firms' year-ahead unit cost expectations largely reflects the level of supply chain and labor disruption experienced. At the time of this analysis, firms anticipated these disruptions and lack of labor availability to persist well into 2023, a fact not lost on monetary policymakers.

Second, we go beyond simply looking at the first moment (i.e. mean) to explore a higher-moment (i.e. skewness) of survey expectations. Entering into the pandemic, after an extended period of low, stable inflation, these nominal marginal cost risk indicators reveal that the balance of risks was weighted to the downside, as more weight was assigned to the lowest two bins in the five-bin distribution. However, firms quickly reversed course, placing more and more weight in the upper two bins. By April 2022, firms were assigning more than one-third of the weight to unit costs persisting above 5 percent increases

[☆] We thank the guest editor Catherine Kyrtsov, two anonymous referees and participants at the 43rd International Symposium on Forecasting, the 5th Behavioral Macroeconomics Workshop, Central Bank Research Association 2023 Annual Meeting, Conference on "Inflation Dynamics in a New Era of Energy Price Shocks", and seminar at George Washington University for their helpful comments. This research was initiated while Brian Prescott was in the Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. The views expressed here are the authors' and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: brent.meyer@atl.frb.org (B.H. Meyer), b.prescott@wustl.edu (B.C. Prescott), sheng@american.edu (X.S. Sheng).

over the year-ahead and just 2 percentage points of weight to a sharp decrease in unit costs. These are striking shifts in the balance of risks to firms' unit cost outlook. By the end of our sample, upside (inflationary) risks had far outweighed the potential for perceived downside (deflationary) risks over the year ahead.

Third, we explore the role of supply chain disruptions in driving unit cost expectations and risk. We find that supply chain disruption and bottlenecks (along with labor constraints) imparted significant upward pressure on firms' costs. Moreover, using our unique data on year-ahead business unit cost expectations in conjunction with special question modules that build upon the Census Bureau's Small Business Pulse Survey, we find a meaningful impact of disruption on firms' year-ahead expectations. Supply disruption has impacted goods-producing firms to a greater extent than service-providing firms, and this is reflected in their year-ahead expectations. The effects of supply chain disruptions on firms' unit cost expectations and risk remain significant even after controlling for demand factors (orders backlog, new orders or sales gap). We find that, after removing the impact of demand factors, supply chain disruptions accounted for roughly 40 percent of the increase in manufacturers' unit cost expectations and nearly one-third of the increase in service-providers' unit cost expectations from early 2020 to late 2022.

Our paper is closely related to a large literature on using survey expectations to elicit agents' beliefs. For example, Cavallo et al. (2017) and Afrouzi and Yang (2021) document firms' and households' pervasive inattention to aggregate inflation. Altig et al. (2022) and Meyer and Sheng (2022) elicit business expectations and uncertainty on own-firm quantities (i.e. unit cost, sales revenue and employment growth) to make inferences for the aggregate economy.

Our paper also builds on the burgeoning literature on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on economic activity and agents' expectations. Bartik et al. (2020), Balleer et al. (2020), Alekseev et al. (2023), and Hassan et al. (2023) found that firms, on net, viewed the onset of the pandemic as a demand shock, lowering their inflation expectations and selling prices. Yet, by early 2021, broadening and intensifying supply chain disruption was leading to elevated costs and item stockouts (Cavallo and Kryvtsov, 2023), much higher producer price index (Santacreu and LaBelle, 2022), accelerated transportation costs (Benigno et al., 2022), and a sizable and persistent reduction in labor force participation (Rodríguez-Clare et al., 2023).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the data set. Section 3 analyzes the dynamics of firms' expectations during the pandemic. Section 4 explores the role of supply and demand factors in driving firms' unit cost expectations and risks. Section 5 concludes. Additional tables and graphs are relegated to the online appendix.

2. Data

The primary data source used is the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Business Inflation Expectations (BIE) survey. The BIE is a monthly survey of business owners, executives, and managers in the sixth Federal Reserve district that has been fielded continuously since October 2011. During each wave, in addition to two short qualitative introductory questions, firms provide their expectation of year-ahead nominal marginal (unit) cost expectations and perceived year-over-year unit cost growth. Additionally, respondents are asked a set of rotating quarterly questions and a short set of special questions in each wave. The rotating quarterly questions capture information on firms' quantitative sales gaps relative to "normal", drivers of cost and price pressures, and their longer-run (5–10 year ahead) unit cost expectations.

Broadly speaking, the 6th Federal Reserve District, which spans most of the American Southeast, mirrors the makeup of the US in terms of industry and firm-size breakdown. By design, the panel composition of the BIE roughly reflects the makeup of the national economy at

the two-digit NAICS level. The evolution of the BIE's one-year ahead unit costs expectations is of primary interest in this paper. These expectations are elicited probabilistically using a method popularized by Manski (2004). The choice to elicit firms' forward expectations for unit costs is dually motivated. First, utilizing the long and rich literature on eliciting the inflation expectations of households, we chose to focus on a key determinant of price-setting behavior that is intimately connected to aggregate inflation and is salient in the minds of respondents. Second, as shown in Meyer and Sheng (2022), the term "unit costs" are synonymous with nominal marginal costs – a key driving variable for firms' price-setting behavior in the micro-founded New Keynesian Philips Curve (Sbordone, 2005). As Meyer and Sheng (2022) show, firms' unit cost realizations vary meaningfully by industry, but once aggregated covary strongly with aggregate inflation statistics.¹ And, while own-firm unit cost expectations also vary meaningfully by industry, upon aggregation, firms' aggregated unit cost expectations tend to mirror professional forecasters' year-ahead inflation expectations. In this sense, aggregating up firms' own-cost realizations and expectations gives us a useful measure of future price pressures that are salient in the perceptions and expectations of businesses.

Eliciting and tracking own-firm or industry-level expectations that are less likely to suffer from inattention and noisy beliefs about aggregates is becoming more prevalent. Recent work by Afrouzi (2023) argues for aggregating expectations of competitors (industry-level) price expectations due to strategic inattention that creates a wedge between prices firms find relevant and aggregate inflation expectations. Others, such as Verbrugge and Zaman (2021) evaluate the performance of aggregated own-firm expectations and show that the BIE's unit cost expectations perform strongly in both in-sample and pseudo out-of-sample inflation forecasting exercises.

The BIE questionnaire contains space (at the end of every monthly survey) for short, special question modules. This space allows researchers to ask questions that are policy-relevant, topical, or related to broader academic research. These "special" questions are increasingly being used by researchers across a variety of survey efforts to uncover causal estimates, engage in randomized controlled trials, and test the inclusion of alternative questions for future changes in core questionnaires. In this paper we build on the special questions fielded in the BIE early in the pandemic to gauge how firms were responding to the initial COVID shock (see MPS 2022) to elicit information for how firms' behavior and expectations evolved as the pandemic wore on.

To measure the breadth and severity supply disruptions and crimped labor supply were having on firms' realizations and expectations, we began fielding a repeated module of special questions in March 2021. Specifically, we expanded on a well-designed and tested set of questions fielded in the Census Bureau's Small Business Pulse Survey.² In March, June, and August 2021, February 2022, and August 2022, we fielded these questions; see details in Online Appendix A. Rather than just replicating the Census' results – which reflect the share of firms experiencing each aspect of disruption in supply chains and the operating capacity of the firm – we expanded on these questions by asking follow-up questions designed to gauge the intensity of the disruption the firm was experiencing. For example, if a respondent indicated that they were experiencing "supplier delays", we posed a follow-up asking business executives, "How would you describe the impact of each disruption

¹ Additional assurances of response quality and external validity such as survey response rates (averaging roughly 40%), firm-size and sector breakdowns, the impact of tenure on first and second moment expectations, the impact of question wording, responses to cognitive interviews, and the relationship of BIE responses to other national expectations surveys can be found in Meyer and Sheng (2022). The core BIE questionnaire wording can be found in the Online Appendix A.

² <https://www.census.gov/data/experimental-data-products/small-business-pulse-survey.html>

your business encountered?” The response options were “none”, “little to none”, “mild”, “moderate”, and “severe”.

We cover the results of these questions in the following section. While these results were quite informative on their own merit, especially for policymakers,³ to make full use of the breadth and scope of these supply-side constraints and relate them to firms’ unit-cost expectations, we transformed these responses into firm-level intensity-of-disruption indexes. To create this measure, we first assigned a score from 0 to 4 to each special question response based on whether they responded “None” (0), “Little to none” (1), “Mild” (2), “Moderate” (3), or “Severe”(4). We then add their scores to obtain their disruption index. For example, in March 2021 the mean disruption index value for firms in goods-producing industries was 9.3 and 6.6 for service-providing firms. And, consistent with anecdotes, other research, and news stories, the disruption indexes were the highest in manufacturing industries (9.75) and trade and transportation industries (9.1).

In addition to the BIE microdata and special question results, we utilize other measures of disruption that researchers have leaned on heavily to explore supply and demand factors on firms’ behavior and expectations during the pandemic—namely, order backlogs and supplier delivery times for the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors from the Institute of Supply Management. In a regression framework, we also use the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, which is an amalgamation of several different indicators of cross-boarder transportation costs (i.e. the Baltic Dry Index, the Harper Index, PPIs for air transportation costs) and country-level manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Indexes (PMIs).⁴

Next, we evaluate the evolution of survey measures of inflation expectations and compare them to the BIE aggregated unit-cost measure as the pandemic has evolved. Specifically, we compare the aggregate BIE 1-year ahead unit cost expectations to other well-known and often-cited survey measures of household (University of Michigan and FRBNY) and professional (Survey of Professional Forecasters and Blue Chip) inflation expectations.

3. Evolution of Firms’ expectations during the pandemic

“As the reopening continues, shifts in demand can be large and rapid, and bottlenecks, hiring difficulties, and other constraints could continue to limit how quickly supply can adjust...”

[— Chair Powell. June 16, 2021⁵]

At the onset of the pandemic, firms, on net, viewed the COVID-19 shock as a demand shock (MPS 2022). Amid the sharpest decline in economic activity in the post-WWII era, firms, en masse, lowered their year-ahead unit cost expectations, lowered current and expected sales prices, and, especially for firms that were experiencing significant COVID-related disruption, lowered nominal wages for many high- and low-skill workers. Moreover, in response to special questions regarding the severity of the impact COVID was having on firms’ sales activity, supply chains, and business operations, the majority of firms indicated that the disruption to sales activity was far more severe than the attendant supply chain disruption. However, as the pandemic wore on into 2021, even amid a very large reallocation shock and a dramatic amount of dispersion across firm sales revenue (Barrero et al., 2020), demand rebounded sharply. By the second quarter of 2021, real GDP had regained its pre-pandemic levels. Firms clearly felt the return of demand and attendant cost pressures due to supply chain disruption

and labor constraints. Fig. 1 plots firms’ quantitative sales gap measure from the BIE for all firms and by firm size classes. Firms of all sizes experienced the sharpest decline in sales levels relative to “normal” in the short (decade long) history of the BIE. Prior to the pandemic, this survey-based measure of a sales gap carried a very high correlation with the CBO’s output gap measure. Consistent with Bartik et al. (2020), the smallest firms reported a much larger hit to sales levels than firms with more than 100 employees. Moreover, these patterns are also consistent with other business survey findings that elicited the anticipated impact of COVID on sales levels in 2020 (Bloom et al., 2021).

Despite the sharp decline at the onset of the pandemic, and consistent with Santacreu and LaBelle (2022), firms’ unit costs rose sharply starting in the fourth quarter of 2020. By late 2021, the series had reached its highest levels on record (dating back to 2011). At the same time, we also saw a surge in firms’ aggregated unit cost expectations, peaking at levels roughly double its pre-pandemic average. Fig. 2 plots firms’ unit cost realizations over the past year alongside the year-over-year growth rate in the GDP deflator.⁶ The correlation is quite astounding and provides some further support for the role that unit costs play in inflation determination as well as support for the external validity of our survey instrument.⁷ In addition to the sharp increase in unit cost realizations, firms’ aggregated unit cost expectations rose to the highest-level we have recorded in our decade-long timeseries. Moreover, the cross-sectional distribution of firm’s unit cost expectations (i.e. the first-moment expectations from firms’ probability distributions), which was clearly centered on unit cost expectations around 2 percent prior to the pandemic, shifted sharply at the onset of supply chain disruption and labor constraints, ending 2022 with a modal expectation of 4 percent (see Figure B.1).

As we mentioned at the outset of this paper, we elicit firm-level subjective probability distributions for year-ahead unit costs by utilizing a fixed-bin approach popularized by Manski (2004). Changes in firms’ probability distributions can be exploited to provide richer insight into the nature of their expectations. Fig. 3 plots three novel, but simple measures of the evolution of own-firm probabilistic expectations. The first is simply the difference in the average weight assigned to the highest bin (unit costs up greater than 5%) minus the lowest bin (unit costs decreasing more than a percentage point). The second is the difference between the highest two bins and the lowest two bins. And, the third is simply the average weight assigned to the highest bin. In essence, these measures are indicators of aggregated unit cost risk, with the last measure just tracking upside risks as opposed to the balance of risks.⁸ And, while a fulsome investigation of how unit cost risk relates to the anchoring of expectations is outside the scope of this paper, Fig. 3 elucidates how the typical firm’s projections for future unit cost have evolved over the course of the pandemic. Entering into the pandemic, after years of low, stable inflation (below the FOMC’s price stability

⁶ Realized and expected unit cost growth measures are aggregated using industry-share of GDP. In practice, weighting only leads to quantitatively minor differences relative to the unweighted series.

⁷ Some will note that the sharp increase in both unit cost realizations and the GDP deflator starting in late 2020 is contributing to the tight comovement in both series (as we show is also the case between household and firm inflation expectations in the next section). However, the pre-COVID correlation coefficient is 0.88.

⁸ The initial bin choices and widths were based on the distribution of unit cost realizations during the testing phase of the BIE, at a time when aggregate inflation was low and relatively stable. Given the BIE’s fixed-bin approach to eliciting probabilistic unit cost expectations, amid a high aggregate inflation environment, a level-shift in unit cost expectations appears as an increase in skewness. However, comparing these evolution of these probabilistic distributions to the pre-pandemic norms provides a rich indicator of the likely trajectory of unit cost growth and, given the strong correlation between unit cost realizations and aggregate inflation statistics, the likely trajectory of aggregate inflation as well.

³ <https://www.atlantafed.org/news/speeches/2021/10/12/bostic-the-current-inflation-episode>

⁴ <https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2022/01/a-new-barometer-of-global-supply-chain-pressures/>

⁵ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20210616.pdf>




Fig. 1. Average quantitative sales gaps by firm size.
 Notes: This figure plots the average quantitative sales gap by firm size. Firm size designations are “Small (1–99 employees)”, “Midsize (100–499 employees)”, and “Large (500+ employees)”.
 Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s *Business Inflation Expectations* survey.




Fig. 2. Firms’ realized unit cost growth vs. actual inflation.
 Notes: The sample period begins in 2011Q3 and ends in 2022Q4. The BIE series are weighted by industry-share of GDP and quarterly averages are plotted. Given the nature of the panel, the most apt comparison is to the broadest notion of overall inflation (i.e. GDP price index). The BIE series is plotted on the left axis and the GDP Price Index is plotted on the right axis.
 Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s *Business Inflation Expectations* survey.




Fig. 3. Measures of firms' unit cost risk.

Notes: The terms uc_1 , uc_2 , uc_4 , and uc_5 correspond to average probabilities assigned to unit cost changes of less than 1 percent (unit costs down), between -1 and 1 percent (unit costs about unchanged), up between 3.1 percent and 5 percent (unit costs up significantly), and up greater than 5 percent (unit costs up very significantly), respectively. The figure reads as the difference in the average probabilities assigned to high and low unit cost states for two balance of risks measures (dotted lines). The solid line shows the weight assigned to the highest bin (unit costs up greater than 5%). The shaded region represents the COVID-19 recession as defined by the NBER.

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's *Business Inflation Expectations* survey; authors' calculations.

target), these unit cost risk indicators reveal that the balance of risks was weighted to the downside (as more weight was assigned to the lowest two bins in the five-bin distribution). In April and May of 2020, the typical firm had assigned a nearly 15 percent likelihood that their costs were going to decline by more than 1 percent over the year ahead and just an 8 percent likelihood of unit costs increasing greater than 5 percent. However, firms quickly reversed course, placing more and more weight in the upper two bins. By April 2022, firms were assigning more than one-third of the weight to unit costs persisting above 5 percent increases over the year head and just 2 percentage points of weight to a sharp decrease in unit costs. These are striking shifts in the balance of risks to firms' unit cost outlook. By the end of our sample, upside risks had far outweighed the potential for perceived downside risks over the year ahead. These risk measures also help provide context for the BIE's unit cost uncertainty metrics, which have fallen during the course of the pandemic. Essentially, firms, en masse, have reacted strongly to the persistent disruption and elevated cost environment over the past two years.

3.1. Comparison to other survey-based inflation expectations

Much attention has been paid to household-based measures of inflation expectations at the outset of the pandemic, the University of Michigan's Survey of Consumers (MSC) and the New York Fed's Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE). Fig. 4 clearly shows that over the early months of the pandemic in 2020, household expectations increased sharply. For example, the MSC measure increased by 1.1 percentage points to 3.2 percent over the course of a single month—from April 2020 to May 2020. The increase in the NY Fed's SCE measure was not quite as sharp, rising 0.4 percentage points in May 2020.⁹ While some

⁹ Interestingly, the NY Fed's questionnaire elicits both point estimates and expected values from probabilistic distributions. And, in May 2020, the

may be tempted to view this divergence as households held an initial view that the COVID shock was a supply-side shock, as shown in Meyer et al. (2022), grocery store prices comprised nearly the entirety of the upper tail of the price change distribution for the consumers' market-basket. Moreover, as forwarded by Cavallo et al. (2017), households form beliefs about aggregate price movements based on salient items that they frequently observe—namely food and energy prices. That these price changes for grocery store items and gasoline impart a disproportionate impact on households' year-ahead expectations, combined with a sharp increase in these relative prices at the onset of the pandemic likely led to the divergence.¹⁰

As the pandemic wore on, amid burgeoning and (eventually) seemingly persistent supply chain disruption and labor constraints, retail price pressure broadened out significantly. Figure B.2 plots the expenditure-weighted share of the CPI rising at rates greater than 3 percent and 5 percent, respectively. At the onset of the pandemic, these shares fell modestly, but remained within their typical, pre-pandemic relevant ranges, an indicator that much of the price movement in the overall CPI (and core CPI) was driven by swings in a few relative price changes rather than a fulsome shift in underlying inflation. However, as we moved through 2021 that changed swiftly. By May 2021, two-thirds of the CPI price-change distribution was rising at rates greater than 3 percent. And, by June 2022, almost 80 percent of the retail market-basket was rising at rates greater than 5 percent – a clear signal that inflationary pressures had become quite widespread and very intense

median point prediction rose by roughly 1 percentage point to 4.1 percent. See Engelberg et al. (2009) for discussions on the divergence between point and probabilistic expectations.

¹⁰ An alternative explanation, forwarded by Afrouzi and Yang (2021) argues that, as inflation rose sharply and became more volatile during the pandemic, inflation expectations have become more sensitive to news about relevant price pressures.




Fig. 4. Time-series of inflation expectations by agent type.

Notes: The surveys in the figure are as follows: Atlanta Fed’s *Business Inflation Expectations* survey (BIE), Philly Fed’s *Survey of Professional Forecasters* (SPF), Wolters Kluwer’s *Blue Chip Economic Indicators* (BCEI), New York Fed’s *Survey of Consumer Expectations* (SCE), and Michigan’s *Survey of Consumers* (MSC). The BCEI displays year-ahead GDP price index expectations. The left panel plots data on a quarterly frequency between 2018q1 and 2022q4. The right panel plots data on a monthly frequency from January 2018 through December 2022. The shaded region represents the COVID-19 recession as defined by the NBER.

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Wolters Kluwer, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and University of Michigan.

(rising to its highest level since early 1981). In fact, the U.S. has not witnessed an inflationary period like the current episode since the Great Inflation period of the 1970s and early 1980s, so long ago that the majority of the prime-age working population has not had prior first-hand experience with a high inflation environment.

Amid these widespread price pressures, all survey-based measures of year-ahead inflation expectations increased sharply. While there is disagreement across all measures in terms of the level of expected inflation, directionally all measures are converging. Fig. 5 plots the recursive correlation coefficient between the year-ahead expectations from the BIE panel and the Blue Chip Panel of Economic forecasters’ year-ahead expectations, and the MSC and SCE household measures of inflation expectations. As discussed at length in Meyer and Sheng (2022), over the pre-pandemic period, firms’ and professional forecasters’ expectations comove strongly but are nearly uncorrelated with MSC household expectations and are only weakly correlated with the SCE’s median probabilistic year-ahead aggregate inflation expectations.¹¹ However, by the end of our sample period, nearly all measures carry the same high correlation.

One interpretation of this, at least directional, convergence is that due to the overwhelmingly widespread and elevated inflationary environment, the influence of salient food and energy prices in the minds

¹¹ BIE 1-year ahead unit cost expectations are most highly correlated with 1-year ahead GDP Price Index expectations from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Given that the BIE is eliciting unit cost expectations from a panel of businesses comprising firms across all broad industry and firm-size cuts, the most apt aggregate inflation statistic for comparison is the GDP Deflator—which is a much broader measure of inflationary pressures than aggregate statistics based on retail prices alone. Hence, the very high correlation with the SPF’s 1-year ahead GDP Deflator expectations is unsurprising to us (especially given that unit cost realizations track the GDP deflator very closely as well).

of households when forming aggregate inflation expectations has been essentially washed out, in that the majority of all prices in the economy are rising at elevated rates. That said, should the relative prices of gasoline and at grocery stores begin to diverge from price pressures elsewhere in the economy, we would anticipate the correlation between firms’ and households’ inflation expectations to revert to their pre-COVID averages.

4. Firms’ unit cost expectations and disruptions

4.1. The effect of supply chain disruptions

On the supply side, supply chain disruption and shipping bottlenecks were evident in the Institute for Supply Management (ISM)’s supplier deliveries indexes for both goods-producers and service-providers; see Fig. 6. Outside of a sharp spike at the onset of pandemic, these measures rose sharply, again with strains appearing first and more severely in the manufacturing sector and then becoming quite evident in the services sector as well. A broader measure of supply chain disruption, the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI) from the NY Fed, which captures global crimps in supply chains and shipping bottlenecks showed a very similar surge, peaking at 4 standard deviations above its average value in December 2021. These indexes began to re-trace their upside movements starting in early 2022. As of December 2022, the GSCPI was back down to just 2 standard deviations about its average value and the ISM supplier deliveries indexes (especially for the manufacturing sector) had ebbed appreciably.

Consistent with both the ISM data and the NY Fed’s GSCPI, in March 2021 we found that more than half of the firms in our panel felt some form of supplier delay; see Table 1. The prevalence of this disruption is particularly striking for a few reasons. First, the BIE panel, like the nation, is disproportionately weighted toward service-providing firms. Second, three months prior, in a separate special question, “supply




Fig. 5. Recursive correlation of monthly measures with BIE.

Notes: The surveys in the figure are as follows: Atlanta Fed’s *Business Inflation Expectations* survey (BIE), Wolters Kluwer’s *Blue Chip Economic Indicators* (BCEI), New York Fed’s *Survey of Consumer Expectations* (SCE), and Michigan’s *Survey of Consumers* (MSC). The BCEI displays year-ahead GDP price index expectations. The x-axis displays the final in-sample period used to calculate the correlation. The beginning of the sample period is October 2011, i.e. the beginning of the BIE survey. The shaded region represents the COVID-19 recession as defined by the NBER.

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Wolters Kluwer, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and University of Michigan.




Fig. 6. Time-series of measures for supply and demand.

Notes: The variables from ISM are new orders, backlogs, and supplier delivery times. Each of these variables is an index with maximum potential value at 100. We use the New York Fed’s global supply chain pressure measure which is reported in standard deviations. The data are plotted on a monthly frequency from October 2011 through December 2022. The shaded region denotes the COVID-19 recession as defined by the NBER.

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, ISM.

Table 1

Type and intensity of supply chain disruptions experienced by firms.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's *Business Inflation Expectations* survey; authors' calculations.

	In the last week, did your business have any of the following?									
	Share of firms					Moderate to severe disruption				
	Mar 21	Jun 21	Aug 21	Feb 22	Aug 22	Mar 21	Jun 21	Aug 21	Feb 22	Aug 22
Supplier delays	55.1	64.1	62	71	60	37.9	49.4	52	57	54
Difficulty locating alternate suppliers	23.7	34.7	41	40	36	16.7	27.1	36	33	47
Production delays	24.7	30	29	32	25	15.2	21.8	21	22	34
Delivery/shipping delays	37.4	41.8	41	45	34	22.2	30.6	34	36	40
None	35.9	31.2	31	24	30	–	–	–	–	–

	In the last week, was your business's operating capacity affected by any of the following?									
	Share of firms					Moderate to severe disruption				
	Mar 21	Jun 21	Aug 21	Feb 22	Aug 22	Mar 21	Jun 21	Aug 21	Feb 22	Aug 22
Ability to re-hire laid off employees	13.1	22.4	21	21	14	9.1	17.1	18	18	25
Availability of employees to work	32.8	52.9	55	62	45	21.2	40.6	41	46	50
Ability of employees to work from home	11.1	7.1	5	11	5	5.6	3.5	3	7	9
Physical distancing of employees	15.2	4.1	14	6	6	8.6	1.8	6	2	9
Physical distancing of customers	17.2	6.5	10	9	6	8.6	3.5	6	4	12
Availability of PPE	2.5	1.2	1	2	1	1.5	0.6	0	0	2
Availability of other supplies or inputs	30.8	40	49	50	40	21.2	34.7	41	44	64
None	34.3	29.4	20	19	29	–	–	–	–	–

Notes: The columns March 2021, June 2021, August 2021, February 2022, and August 2022 correspond to the survey waves when the questions were asked.

chain concerns” ranked eighth out of their top 10 concerns for the year-ahead.¹² In addition to issues receiving raw materials and intermediate inputs from suppliers, a little more than one in three firms in the BIE panel also indicated they were experiencing delays in fulfillment and roughly a third indicated they were having difficulties with their employees' availability to work.

Even more striking, back in March 2021, was that conditional on experiencing “supplier delays”, the majority indicated they were already experiencing moderate-to-severe disruption. In fact, nearly 40 percent of the overall panel indicated the presence of “moderate to severe” delays in supplier deliveries as of March 2021.

The breadth and intensity of disruption only grew more severe throughout 2021 and into early 2022. Figure B.3 plots the evolution of the “moderate to severe” intensity for the most frequently experienced responses to this special module on supply chain disruption and operational capacity. By February 2022, nearly 60 percent of firms in the BIE panel indicated “moderate to severe” supply chain disruption and 36 percent indicated delays in delivery of their product or service (roughly corresponding with the peak in the NY Fed's GSCPI). Moreover, by early 2021, nearly half of the firms in the BIE panel indicated “moderate to severe” issues with employee availability and 44 percent indicated that the availability of supplies or inputs was impacting their ability to meet demand.

In August 2022, there was some indications of supply chain “thawing” (again, consistent with the ISM and GSCPI), as the share of firms experiencing supplier delays edged down to 60 percent and only half of the panel indicated that supplier delays were “moderate to severe”. However, firms continued to indicate growing and intensifying pressures in the availability of labor.

Comparing these responses to the Census Bureau's Small Business Pulse Survey, we find that the relative rankings of sources of disruption are quite similar—supplier delays far outweighed other supply chain disruptions, and the “availability of employees for work” was the most frequently cited sources of disrupted operations. Yet we find a greater incidence of disruption (even if we restrict our sample only to small firms).¹³

¹² https://www.atlantafed.org/research/inflationproject/bie/special-questions.aspx?pub_year=2020

¹³ For example, 40 percent of firms surveyed by the Census Bureau indicated supplier delays, which slightly more than half of firms indicated to us.

There is one other important aspect of relating firm-level survey evidence to macroeconomic data on supply chain disruption and shipping bottlenecks, and this has to do with the endogenous impacts of supply and demand. Series from the ISM's PMI, such as order backlogs and delivery times are not entirely “clean” measures of demand and supply shocks. For example, order backlogs can represent both increased demand, but also could reflect delays in firms receiving intermediate inputs that would allow them to fulfill demand. Conversely, increased delivery times, while likely reflecting shipping bottlenecks and other supply-side constraints, could also be polluted by surging demand at the same time. Here, survey evidence may be helpful in disentangling firms' perceptions of whether supply or demand factors dominate. For example, in MPS (2022), firms clearly saw the impact the onset of the pandemic was having on supply and demand, and judged, in the balance, that the shortfall in demand was outweighing supply constraints. And, carefully constructed modules like the Census' Small Business Pulse (and our extension of their questions) allow researchers a more granular look into how firm managers are perceiving specific aspects of these supply and operational constraints.

To relate our findings on supply chain disruption and crimped operational capacity to firms' year-ahead unit-cost expectations, we create summary “Disruption Indexes” based on the special question modules detailed above.¹⁴ In particular, we construct a total disruption index based on the breadth and severity of both supply chain disruption and labor constraints (crimped operational capacity) and then separate out the overall disruption index into a “supply chain disruption index” and a “labor constraints” index (see Fig. 7).

A few aspects of Fig. 7 stand out. First, the mean level of disruption increases from a mean of 7 in March 2021 throughout the next year, peaking at nearly 11 by February 2022. Second, consistent with

Such a discrepancy is unlike previous comparisons to other Census Bureau work (which match quite closely) and could be the result of a number of survey-specific factors. For instance, the types of respondents differ markedly—whereas the BIE elicits responses mainly from those in the C-suite and business owners, the census typically aims for lower-level accounting and finance employees in a given organization. Additionally, the number of response options also differs slightly, and census respondents have seen these questions on disruption to supply chains and operating capacity numerous times over the pandemic.

¹⁴ See Online Appendix A for further detail on the construction of these disruption indexes.




Fig. 7. Box and whisker plot of supply chain disruptions and labor constraints.
 Notes: The horizontal rule represents the median disruption index, while the dot inside the boxplot represents the mean. Disruption indexes are calculated using responses to the special question module based on the Census’ Small Business Pulse questions and extended by the Atlanta Fed to gauge the intensity of disruption. We calculate the disruption indexes by assigning a score of 0 through 4 to responses to the question, “How would you describe the impact of each disruption your business encountered?”, where 0 is assigned to unchecked responses (an indication that a firm did not experience that particular disruption), 1 is Little to none, 2 is Mild, 3 is Moderate, and 4 is Severe. The minimum of these disruption indexes is 0. The maximum total disruption (supply chain + labor disruptions) is 44, with a maximum of 16 for supply chain disruptions and 28 for labor and operational constraints. For further details, see Online Appendix A.
 Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s *Business Inflation Expectations* survey, March 2021, June 2021, August 2021, February 2022, and August 2022; authors’ calculations.

the broadening prevalence of supply chain disruption measured by the ISM’s diffusion index, the mean and median converge over time. Also, there is a tremendous amount of heterogeneity in disruption. The spread of the interquartile range remains wide in each successive fielding wave.

Figure B.4 digs further into the nature of the supply disruption, by separating the disruption index by goods-producing and service-providing sectors. Here, we note two meaningful differences. Given the relatively heavy reliance on physical inputs and materials in the production process, it should come as no surprise that the intensity of disruption is more highly felt by the typical goods-producing firm. Moreover, the onset of labor constraints, which are more likely to impact service-providing firms to a greater degree, followed the sharp increase in supply disruption and continued to rise throughout the pandemic period. In March 2021, the mean disruption index value for firms in goods-producing industries was 9.3 and 6.6 for service-providing firms. Yet, there is heterogeneity within these very broad industry breakdowns. Disruption was highest in manufacturing industries (9.75 in March 2021) and trade and transportation services industries (9.1). Also of note, the average disruption index value in goods-producing industries leveled out between August 2021 and February 2022, while it continued to increase in service-providing industries, reaching an average value of roughly 9 by February 2022. This, again, is consistent with the growing prevalence of labor constraints, as the demand for labor continued to increase alongside the swift resumption of economic activity, but the labor force participation rate remained depressed relative to its pre-pandemic levels throughout this time period.

In Figs. 8, 9, and B.6, we relate firm-level year-ahead unit cost expectations (unit cost risk) to firm-level total disruption, lagged total disruption, supply-specific disruptions, and labor disruptions. The binscatters show a meaningful relationship between each measure of disruption and unit cost expectations and risk. Although supply chain

disruption and labor constraints are not the only factors influencing year-ahead unit-cost expectations, we can clearly see that firms experiencing the largest levels of disruption tend to be those that hold higher expectations for future unit cost and higher upside unit cost risk.¹⁵ Perhaps unsurprisingly, the relationship between unit cost expectations (or risk) and supply chain disruptions is much stronger than labor constraints. But, what was surprising to us was the significance of lagged disruption on current unit cost expectations (or risk).

The persistence of these supply shocks in the minds of business executives is one very interesting aspect of this relationship. Lagged disruption remains highly correlated with current-period unit cost expectations (and risks), suggesting some stickiness in this relationship and implying that over the pandemic period, once supply disruption and labor constraints had set in, they were stubbornly persistent. However, that view evolved over the course of the pandemic. We posed a follow-up question after the special question module on supply disruptions and operational constraints in June 2021, August 2021, February 2022, and August 2022, asking the following question to firms that indicated the presence of specific disruptive factor regardless of how intense: How long do you anticipate these disruptions will continue to impact your business? The response options were: “up to 3 months”, “3–6 months”, “6–12 months” and “longer than 12 months”.¹⁶ In June 2021, very few firms experiencing supplier delays anticipated them lasting longer than 12 months and the modal expectation was

¹⁵ The slope of and fit of these regressions are consistent across all waves where we collect disruption information and when pooling across all waves. In Figure B.5, we also relate firm-level disruption indexes to year-ahead price expectations. The results are similar.

¹⁶ These results are posted on the Business Inflation Expectations Special Question repository, here: https://www.atlantafed.org/research/inflationproject/bie/special-questions.aspx?pub_year=2021.




Fig. 8. Business disruptions and short-run unit cost expectations.

Notes: The lag frequency is taken to be the last survey wave which asked about business disruptions. For example, since business disruptions were asked about during March 2021 and June 2021, then the lagged value of disruption would be from March 2021 while the current value of unit cost expectations is June 2021. The supply chain disruptions variable is constructed using special questions from the BIE’s business disruption special question series. See the first (top) set of responses in Appendix A. Further detail on the specific questions used and construction of the disruption indexes can be found in Online Appendix A.

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s *Business Inflation Expectations* survey; authors’ calculations.




Fig. 9. Business disruptions and short-run unit cost risk.

Notes: We define unit cost risk as the probability assigned to the largest year-ahead unit cost scenario. That is, the assigned probability that unit cost growth will exceed 5 percent. The lag frequency is taken to be the last survey wave which asked about business disruptions. For example, since business disruptions were asked about during March 2021 and June 2021, then the lagged value of disruption would be from March 2021 while the current value of unit cost expectations is June 2021. The labor supply disruptions variable is constructed using the labor specific special questions from the BIE’s business disruption special question series. See the second (bottom) set of responses in Appendix A. Further detail on the specific questions used and construction of the disruption indexes can be found in Online Appendix A.

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s *Business Inflation Expectations* survey; authors’ calculations.

between 6–12 months. And, perhaps as interestingly, firms anticipated a rather quick resumption in their employees' availability to work. The majority of respondents experiencing labor disruption saw an end to these disruptions within 6 months. However, by August 2022 – fourteen months after we first asked that question – nearly 40 percent of firms anticipated that supplier delays would continue for longer than 12 months, and almost half of respondents saw labor constraints binding for longer than a year. Thus, accumulated duration and the perceived persistence of these disruptive supply factors could account for the steepening in the slope in the relationship between selling prices and firm-level disruption indexes.

In sum, like Santacreu and LaBelle (2022), we find that supply chain disruption and bottlenecks (along with labor constraints) imparted significant upward pressure on firms' costs. Moreover, using our unique data on year-ahead business unit cost expectations in conjunction with special question modules that build upon the Census Bureau's Small Business Pulse Survey, we find a meaningful impact of disruption on firms' year-ahead expectations and risk. Supply disruption has impacted goods-producing firms to a greater extent than service-providing firms.

4.2. Controlling for demand shocks

The empirical analysis above focuses on the impact of supply chain disruptions on unit cost expectations and risk. Amid constrained and disrupted supply chains, however, demand surged as well, as shown in Fig. 6. The ISM's new orders and order backlog indexes for the manufacturing and services sectors show the breadth of the surge in demand. New orders diffusion indexes for both manufacturing and services sectors, which plummeted to their lowest levels since 2008 in April 2020, quickly rebounded with the manufacturing orders index peaking in late 2020. The new orders index for services also rebounded quickly, but peaked about a year later (presumably as vaccination became available to many and households were eager to resume life outside their home after the Delta wave of COVID). Moreover, order backlogs in the manufacturing sector rose almost continually throughout the late 2020 through early 2021 period, peaking in May 2021. The jump in services backlogs was more discrete, rising sharply in mid-2021 (shortly after the 3rd fiscal transfer in March 2021), peaking in October 2021.

To explore the joint effects of supply and demand factors on unit cost expectations, we consider the following regression:

$$Y_{it} = \beta^d D_{it} + \beta^s S_{it} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

where Y_{it} is either year-ahead unit cost expectations or risk of firm i at time t , D_{it} is a measure of aggregate demand or firms' sales gap, and S_{it} is a measure of aggregate supply. We also include firm fixed effects γ_i .

We use three proxies for demand shocks: ISM orders backlog index, ISM new orders index, and BIE sales gap. The two ISM indices are available at a monthly frequency while the BIE data is only available on a quarterly basis. We use ISM supplier delivery times index and FRBNY global supply chain pressure index to proxy supply shocks. Note, our ISM measures of supply and demand factors are matched to individual firms based on whether the firm is a goods or service provider. We are able to identify whether a firm is a good or service provider using their two-digit NAICS code which is provided by the BIE.¹⁷ To make our regression results comparable, we normalize all of our variables, including unit cost expectations, risk, and balance of risk taken from the BIE, by the following transformation: $f(z) = z_{max}^{-1}(z - z_{min})$. Unit cost risk is the average probability assigned to year-ahead unit cost greater than 5 percent by firms. Balance of unit cost risk is defined as the average

¹⁷ If a firm operates in the durable manufacturing, non-durable manufacturing, mining, or utilities sector, then we assume it is a goods provider. Otherwise, we assume that the firm is a service provider.

difference between the probabilities assigned to year-ahead unit cost greater than 5 percent and year-ahead unit cost lower than –1 percent.

Table 2 presents the regression results. Regardless of which proxies used, the demand shock is always statistically significant. Furthermore, after controlling for the impact of demand factors, supply disruptions, including both supplier delivery times and global supply chain pressure, contribute positively and significantly to elevated unit cost expectations (panel A), risk (panel B), and balance of risk (panel C). The only exception is that the coefficients on supplier delivery times are negative (column 1). Further investigation shows that this is caused by the high correlation between backlogs and supplier delivery times, highlighting the need to control for all demand factors when studying the impact of supply disruptions.

To isolate the impact of supply factors only, we consider an alternative empirical strategy. In the first step, we estimate a regression of the form

$$S_{it} = \phi D_{it} + \alpha + u_{it}, \tag{2}$$

where S_{it} is one of two aggregate supply factors (ISM's supplier delivery times index or FRBNY's global supply chain pressure index), and D_{it} denotes the vector of all demand factors. By regressing each of our supply measures on the demand factors, we are able to identify the variation in supply-side pressures not explained by demand-side pressures.

In the second step, we estimate the following equation

$$Y_{it} = \beta E_{ik} \hat{u}_{it} + \gamma_i + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{3}$$

where Y_{it} is year-ahead unit cost expectations or risk of firm i at time t , \hat{u}_{it} is the normalized residual from Eq. (2) by first subtracting the minimum value of \hat{u}_{it} and then being scaled by the maximum value of \hat{u}_{it} , and E_{ik} is the exposure to disruptions of sector k which contains firm i .¹⁸

The two-stage regressions allow us to control for potential demand factors in our estimates of the effect of supply chain disruptions. Table 3 presents the OLS estimates on the interaction term between (normalized) supply chain disruptions and industry-level measures of exposure to disruptions, as well as bootstrap standard errors to avoid the bias associated with the use of the generated regressor. We add a full set of firm and time fixed effects to control for unobserved factors that differ across firms and unobserved common factors that vary over time. The coefficient on the interaction term tests whether unit cost expectations and risks at firms with greater exposure to disruptions covary more strongly with supply factors. We find very strong evidence for this.

The coefficient of 1.48 on the ISM's supplier delivery times (column 1) suggests that for every 1 unit increase in supplier delivery times a firm in the manufacturing sector with, say, a 30% exposure to disruptions would increase its one-year ahead unit cost expectations by 0.44 unit. Given that the normalized supplier delivery times rose by 0.79 unit since the beginning of the pandemic, supplier delivery times explained about 38% (of 0.87 percentage points on average during

¹⁸ We calculate the disruption indexes by assigning a score of 0 through 4 to responses to the question, "How would you describe the impact of each disruption your business encountered?", where 0 is assigned to all unchecked responses (meaning that a firm did not experience that particular disruption), 1 is Little to none, 2 is Mild, 3 is Moderate, and 4 is Severe. The minimum of these disruption indexes is 0. The maximum total disruption (supply chain + labor disruptions) is 44, with a maximum of 16 for supply chain disruptions and 28 for labor and operational constraints. That is, we ask four supply chain disruption questions and seven labor disruption questions. Since not all firms responded during the waves when the special questions were asked, we aggregate our responses to the two-digit NAICS sectoral level. This is done by averaging the disruption index value for all firms in a given sector across all special question survey waves. We then divide the disruption index for each sector by the maximum total value possible for the index. Hence, for total disruptions we divide the index by 44.

Table 2

Relationship between supply factors, demand factors, and unit cost moments.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and ISM; authors' calculations.

Panel A: Expectations						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Positive demand shock</i>						
Backlogs	5.11*** (0.349)			3.65*** (0.328)		
Sales gap		1.95*** (0.259)			1.89*** (0.248)	
New orders			1.70*** (0.198)			1.51*** (0.199)
<i>Negative supply shock</i>						
Supplier delivery times	-1.49*** (0.256)	1.23*** (0.275)	1.08*** (0.246)			
Global supply chain pressure				0.49*** (0.085)	0.85*** (0.092)	1.12*** (0.091)
Observations	7,007	2,231	7,007	7,007	2,236	7,007
R ²	0.52	0.52	0.48	0.52	0.53	0.50
Panel B: Risk						
<i>Positive demand shock</i>						
Backlogs	57.1*** (5.92)			36.3*** (5.44)		
Sales gap		18.1*** (3.83)			17.3*** (3.64)	
New orders			11.7*** (2.88)			8.90*** (2.91)
<i>Negative supply shock</i>						
Supplier delivery times	-12.7*** (3.97)	21.0*** (4.45)	17.1*** (4.29)			
Global supply chain pressure				10.3*** (1.57)	14.3*** (1.68)	16.9*** (1.81)
Observations	7,007	2,231	7,007	7,007	2,236	7,007
R ²	0.45	0.48	0.43	0.46	0.50	0.45
Panel C: Balance of risk						
<i>Positive demand shock</i>						
Backlogs	82.8*** (7.33)			57.3*** (6.68)		
Sales gap		34.2*** (5.14)			33.5*** (4.97)	
New orders			27.3*** (3.98)			24.1*** (3.98)
<i>Negative supply shock</i>						
Supplier delivery times	-26.2*** (5.37)	18.4*** (5.75)	15.6*** (5.20)			
Global supply chain pressure				8.37*** (1.84)	14.4*** (1.98)	18.3*** (2.04)
Observations	7,007	2,231	7,007	7,007	2,236	7,007
R ²	0.44	0.46	0.41	0.44	0.47	0.43

Notes: The variables new orders, backlogs, and supplier delivery times come from ISM. Firms' sales gap, unit cost expectations and risk come from the BIE. The sales gap question is only available on a quarterly basis. Lastly, global supply chain pressure is from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Clustered (firm-level) standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

2020–2022 compared to the averaged value in 2019) of the increase in unit cost expectations for a typical firm in the manufacturing sector. For a typical firm in the service sector, supplier delivery times accounted for roughly one-third of the increase in unit cost expectations since the beginning of the pandemic.

Turning to unit cost risk, measured as the probability assigned to the highest bin (unit costs up greater than 5%). The coefficient of 11.6 (column 3) indicates that for every 1 unit increase in the ISM's supplier delivery times a firm in the manufacturing sector with a 30% exposure to disruptions would assign 3.5% more probability to the highest bin. The results for firms in the service sector or from using an alternative measure of supply chain disruptions such as GSCPI are very similar.

These results are comparable to a variety of other recent papers on pandemic-related disruption. [Cavallo and Kryvtsov \(2023\)](#) find that stockout hikes are associated with a significant inflationary effect that peaks within a couple of months. For the United States, a 10 percentage point increase in stockout rates raises monthly inflation by about 0.1 percentage point. But, the effect is also transitory. The invasion of

Ukraine has resulted in a new set of supply shocks, increasing the world prices of energy and certain foodstuffs, metals, and other commodities and disrupting trade patterns. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development projects that if these supply shocks last for one year, they will reduce U.S. growth by almost one percentage point and raise U.S. inflation by almost 1.5 percentage points in the first full year (see [Labonte and Weinstock \(2022\)](#)). And, exposure to foreign bottlenecks, both in terms of supplier delivery times and backlogs, has a statistically significant effect on US PPI inflation. For backlogs, increasing the month-over-month backlogs by 1 percent increases the industry inflation rate by 0.24 percentage points, while the same increase for delivery times causes an increase of about 0.26 percentage points (see [Santacreu and LaBelle \(2022\)](#)).

5. Conclusion

Firms grappled in real-time to adjust to the unusual and evolving aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that firms, on net, saw

Table 3

Interaction of supply factors with sectoral exposure to disruptions and their impact on unit cost moments.
 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and ISM; authors' calculations.

	Expectations		Risk	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Supplier delivery times	1.48*** (0.387)		11.60* (6.844)	
Global supply chain pressure		0.76** (0.363)		13.0** (6.564)
Observations	7,004	7,004	7,004	7,004
R ²	0.62	0.62	0.53	0.53
Firm fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The variables new orders, backlogs, and supplier delivery times come from ISM. Firms' sales gap, unit cost expectations, and unit cost risk come from the BIE. The quarterly unit cost expectations and risk measures are arithmetic averages over the monthly observations for a given quarter. The sales gap question is only sampled on a quarterly basis. Lastly, global supply chain pressure is from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Both ISM's supplier delivery times and FRBNY's global supply chain pressure are interacted with the sectoral exposure to disruptions measure taken from the BIE. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses. We estimate the standard errors using 10,000 replications and a seed value of 2023.

the first eight months of the pandemic as a demand shock. But, as the pandemic unfolded and the economy began to recover from the imposed lockdowns, supply chain disruption, shipping bottlenecks, and labor constraints grew in breadth and intensity, impacting the ability of firms to meet the strong, stimulus-fueled, surge in demand. Against this swift change current, firms rapidly ratcheted up their year-ahead expectations for pricing pressures, particularly those that were impacted by supply disruption and operating constraints. Moreover, the balance of risks, which was initially weighted to the downside, shifted markedly to the upside. As further discussed in Section 4, both positive demand shocks (increased new orders) and negative supply shocks (longer supplier delivery times and greater supply chain pressure) contributed to the elevated short-term unit cost expectations and risks.

We also view the findings in this paper as relevant to the current monetary policy discussions. Policymakers have begun raising interest rates swiftly in an effort to curb inflationary pressures and prevent elevated short-run inflation expectations from spilling over into the longer run. Chair Powell, in his press conference following the July FOMC meeting, noted that "if you have a sustained period of supply shocks, those can actually start to undermine or to work on de-anchoring inflation expectations".

This high-inflation environment is not lost on businesses. In fact, firms' perceptions (unit-cost realizations) have been highly correlated with the evolution of overall inflation over the course of the pandemic. When general prices increase, businesses' input costs also increase, and as higher costs squeeze margins, many firms will pass some or all of those costs on to their customers in the form of higher prices. Survey evidence we presented suggests a strong correlation between supply chain disruptions and higher year-ahead unit cost expectations. Further regression analysis shows that supply disruptions accounted for roughly 40% of the increase in manufacturers' and nearly one-third of the increase in service-providers' unit cost expectations. And, while supply chain disruptions are not the only factor influencing expectations, firms with the largest levels of disruption tend to hold higher expectations for price pressures in the year ahead. So what are firms telling us about their expectations for the evolution of unit cost over the year ahead and beyond?

Perhaps the easiest way to see how much both short-run and five-year-ahead (long-run) unit cost expectations have moved over the past two years is to index them to their pre-pandemic growth rates. Firms' year-ahead expectations peaked at about twice their pre-pandemic period early in 2022 and, as of December 2022 are still about 1.5

times higher than their pre-pandemic averages. Firms' longer-run expectations peaked about 25 percent higher than the expectations we saw in late 2019 and, while ebbing modestly, remain above their pre-pandemic levels.

We can dig a bit deeper into firms' longer-run expectations by examining the average probability weights that firms assign to the potential outcomes for longer-run unit costs at different periods, as Figure B.7 shows. In this case, we look at the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarters of 2020, 2021, and 2022. These histograms illustrate the degree to which firms' longer-run unit cost expectations have shifted over the course of the pandemic. Here, two aspects of this shift are worth noting. First, through the middle of 2021, even as inflation metrics were beginning to heat up, the distribution of firms' longer-run expectations had not moved much. Second, during the past year, the average probability distribution shifted starkly. The typical panelist assigned more than 50 percent probability to longer-run unit cost increases of at least 3 percent per year through the end of 2022. And, while the modal expectation is for longer-run unit costs rose to 5 percent or more in mid-2022, the distribution of firms' longer-run unit cost expectations (while still right-skewed) started resembling its pre-pandemic averages by December 2022.

A couple of caveats are worth mentioning here. First, this is the first sizable "inflation shock" we have been able to examine in the BIE survey, and we do not have a long enough time series to compare the current era to the Great Inflation period (1965–1982). At best, we can suggest that – given the high correlation between firms' unit cost expectations and professional forecasters' expectations – our measures would have performed similarly in the '70s and '80s. Also, as the extensive literature on consumer expectations documents, the possibility exists for business executives to base their projections for future unit costs largely on current conditions. Still, that last point cuts two ways. First, it is possible that, should inflation ebb meaningfully in the coming quarters, these longer-term expectations might follow suit. Conversely, persistently high inflation could further cement such expectations for the longer run, making it more challenging for policymakers to bring inflation back to their price-stability goals.

Said another way, the current bout of high inflation is unusual in many different ways, and how it will play out remains fraught with uncertainty. Firms' short- and long-run expectations have risen sharply, and longer-run expectations became more responsive to realized and short-run movements in expectations, so much so that the modal expectation in the second quarter of 2022 was an anticipated cost increases greater than 5 percent. While it is too early to declare that firms' longer-run unit cost expectations are unanchored, the events of the past two years may have left longer-run unit cost expectations unsettled.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Brent H. Meyer: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Review and editing, Data curation, Supervision. **Brian C. Prescott:** Formal analysis, Investigation, Software, Visualization, Writing – review & editing. **Xuguang Simon Sheng:** Conceptualization, Review and editing, Supervision, Formal analysis.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106951>.

References

Afrouzi, H., 2023. Strategic Inattention, Inflation Dynamics and the Non-Neutrality of Money. Working Paper, Columbia University, Department of Economics, Elsevier.
 Afrouzi, H., Yang, C., 2021. Dynamic Rational Inattention and the Phillips Curve. CESifo Working Paper No. 8840, Elsevier.
 Alekseev, G., Amer, S., Gopal, M., Kuchler, T., Schneider, J., Stroebel, J., Wernerfelt, N.C., 2023. The effects of COVID-19 on U.S. small businesses: Evidence from owners, managers, and employees. *Manage. Sci.* 69 (1), 7–24.

- Altig, D., Barrero, J.M., Bloom, N., Davis, S.J., Meyer, B.H., Parker, N., 2022. Surveying business uncertainty. *J. Econometrics* 231, 282–303.
- Balleer, A., Link, S., Menkhoff, M., Zorn, P., 2020. Demand or supply? Price adjustment during the COVID-19 pandemic. *Covid Econ.* 31, 59–102.
- Barrero, J.M., Bloom, N., Davis, S.J., 2020. COVID-19 is also a reallocation shock. *Brook. Pap. Econ. Act.* 2020 (2), 329–383.
- Bartik, A.W., Bertrand, M., Cullen, Z., Glaeser, E.L., Luca, M., Stanton, C., 2020. The impact of COVID-19 on small business outcomes and expectations. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA* 117 (30), 17656–17666.
- Benigno, G., di Giovanni, J., Groen, J.J.J., Noble, A.I., 2022. A New Barometer of Global Supply Chain Pressures. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics.
- Bloom, N., Fletcher, R.S., Yeh, E., 2021. The Impact of COVID-19 on US Firms. NBER Working Paper No. 28314.
- Cavallo, A., Cruces, G., Perez-Truglia, R., 2017. Inflation expectations, learning, and supermarket prices: Evidence from survey experiments. *Am. Econ. J.: Macroecon.* 9 (3), 1–35.
- Cavallo, A., Kryvtsov, O., 2023. What can stockouts tell us about inflation? Evidence from online micro data. *Forthcom. J. Int. Econ.*
- Engelberg, J., Manski, C.F., Williams, J., 2009. Comparing the point predictions and subjective probability distributions of professional forecasters. *J. Bus. Econom. Statist.* 27, 30–41.
- Hassan, T.A., Hollander, S., van Lent, L., Schwedeler, M., Tahoun, A., 2023. Firm-level exposure to epidemic diseases: COVID-19, SARS, and H1N1. *Forthcom. Rev. Financial Stud.*
- Labonte, M., Weinstock, L.R., 2022. Supply disruptions and the U.S. economy. In: Congressional Research Service, Vol. IN11926.
- Manski, C.F., 2004. Measuring expectations. *Econometrica* 72 (5), 1329–1376.
- Meyer, B.H., Prescott, B., Sheng, X.S., 2022. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on business expectations. *Int. J. Forecast.* 38, 529–544.
- Meyer, B.H., Sheng, X.S., 2022. Unit Cost Expectations and Uncertainty: Firm' Perspectives on Inflation. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper.
- Rodríguez-Clare, A., Ulate, M., Vasquez, J.P., 2023. Supply chain disruptions, trade costs, and labor markets. *FRBSF Econ. Lett.* 2023–02.
- Santacreu, A.M., LaBelle, J., 2022. Global supply chain disruptions and inflation during the COVID-19 pandemic. *Federal Res. Bank St. Louis Rev.* 104 (2), 1–14.
- Sbordone, A.M., 2005. Do expected future marginal costs drive inflation dynamics? *J. Monetary Econ.* 52, 1183–1197.
- Verbrugge, R., Zaman, S., 2021. Whose inflation expectations best predict inflation? *Econ. Comment. Federal Res. Bank Cleveland* 2021 (19), 1–7.